"President Bush's strategy on Iraq is un-American."
So reads the odd pre-registration byline of this Francis Fukuyama editorial from the New York Times [Online registration required].
Setting aside this odd choice of words, Mr. Fukuyama makes some observations that I consider cogent, but combines them with some pure doozies. A frat boy fisking an internationally renowned intellectual, well, might as well be someone expendable like me.
"As we mark four years since Sept. 11, 2001, one way to organize a review of what has happened in American foreign policy since that terrible day is with a question: To what extent has that policy flowed from the wellspring of American politics and culture, and to what extent has it flowed from the particularities of this president and this administration?"
It is tempting to see continuity with the American character and foreign policy tradition in the Bush administration's response to 9/11, and many have done so. We have tended toward the forcefully unilateral when we have felt ourselves under duress; and we have spoken in highly idealistic cadences in such times, as well. Nevertheless, neither American political culture nor any underlying domestic pressures or constraints have determined the key decisions in American foreign policy since Sept. 11.
It is tempting to see continuity with the American character and foreign policy tradition in the Bush administration's response to 9/11, and many have done so. We have tended toward the forcefully unilateral when we have felt ourselves under duress; and we have spoken in highly idealistic cadences in such times, as well. Nevertheless, neither American political culture nor any underlying domestic pressures or constraints have determined the key decisions in American foreign policy since Sept. 11.
To begin with, the implication from the byline is that if it had not drawn upon American traditions, it is somehow alien and therefore suspect of being incorrect. This is juvenile - the world does not conform itself to American habits and traditions. There was no precedent for the widespread international commitments that American took up to contain the Soviet Union - an isolationist power turned into the guardian of the democratic West through necessity not out of habit or history.
Political culture and domestic pressures? The Bush administration inherited a collossal problem out of thin air, one that Republicans, Democrats, most think tanks and the China obsessed military, had not seriously considered in depth - the 1990s had been a decade-long air walk so long as the problem of Islamic extremism was concerned, some feet have yet to hit the ground. There was no political culture or domestic pressures for any particular way to deal with radical Islam because few people had ever talked about it and those who did were ignored. Even more ominously, there was no discussion of America's place in the post-Cold War world, although a certain intellectual suggested we didn't even need to discuss it. After all, "history had ended," liberal democracy had won, and the big questions needed no longer to be answered. Uh huh, well apparently, it wasn't so, and we're now dealing with reality. But alas, I'll try not to be so snarky with my distinguished elders.
"In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Americans would have allowed President Bush to lead them in any of several directions, and the nation was prepared to accept substantial risks and sacrifices. The Bush administration asked for no sacrifices from the average American, but after the quick fall of the Taliban it rolled the dice in a big way by moving to solve a longstanding problem only tangentially related to the threat from Al Qaeda - Iraq. In the process, it squandered the overwhelming public mandate it had received after Sept. 11. At the same time, it alienated most of its close allies, many of whom have since engaged in "soft balancing" against American influence, and stirred up anti-Americanism in the Middle East."
In the first place, for the most part, the United States did not alienate its "allies". They alienated themselves, for cynical political reasons and a moralistic self-righteous and fundamentally unserious European political climate. The Europeans were not on board for any serious long-term effort, many were barely tolerating us as soon as they discovered innocent people were actually dying during the War in Afghanistan. Civilian casualties in a war? Gee, who would have thought? "Allies" are not countries whom you change your goals to placate, but countries that help you achieve your own goals, mostly because they themselves support your aims. Much of the political class and the public opinion making organs within "Europe" do not support America's general well-being. For the time being we must recognize and deal with this. Anti-Americanism in the Middle East needed little stirring, it goes together about as well as peanut butter and jelly.
Iraq, as tangentially related to the threat from Al Qaeda - OK, I might buy that. Iraq was not a war of choice, the war was brought to us on 9-11, but it most certainly was a theatre of choice within that war, much as North Africa or Burma were during World War II. But where exactly would Mr. Fukuyama or the administration's many critics suggest that we have headed next after Afghanistan? Once Afghanistan was liberated there was no where else the USA could go but Iraq. There were no grounds, nor political consensus, to deal with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Iran [with Saddam unconstrained on our flank, nonetheless]. And considering our military difficulties, I consider it a miracle we did not have that consensus. We have learned many things from Iraq, and possibly the most important is this - to deal with the root of this problem directly, "we're gonna need a bigger boat [military]."
There were no strategies painstakingly developed to deal with the situation presented to the Bush administration, make no mistake we are at war with a branch of one of the world's greatest religions. Not the entire religion, but one well funded and increasingly influential branch, mostly originating in Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Mecca and Medina. We recognize that now, but back then many of us did not even realize this most basic pillar of our situation. The administration started from scratch, looking for a strategy, and the neo-Conservatives provided one where few others could - turn the place upside down. Al Qaeda wants to be revolutionary? Okay, we're the most revolutionary country in world history - the original shot heard round the world.
Will it work? Maybe. Is there a feasible fallback grand strategy visible on either the left or right? Not that I've yet seen, besides a horrific and confused total war against an enemy we can't accurately place and is surrounded by non-combatants.
The Bush administration could instead have chosen to create a true alliance of democracies to fight the illiberal currents coming out of the Middle East. It could also have tightened economic sanctions and secured the return of arms inspectors to Iraq without going to war. It could have made a go at a new international regime to battle proliferation. All of these paths would have been in keeping with American foreign policy traditions. But Mr. Bush and his administration freely chose to do otherwise.
In a perfect world, all of Mr. Fukuyama's suggestions seem so clear. The problem is the state of the world, with its so many opposing interests. An alliance of democracies? Oh how simple, one must think Mr. Fukuyama has been sleeping through the past few years of Europe's utter obstructionism and self-righteous condemnations. They don't understand our war, and they don't want to understand our war. On the most basic level, they resent us and what we stand for, and they lack the self confidence to ever accept such a mission. It is common knowledge that by the late 1990s, economic sanctions on Iraq were held down by the rear-guard action of two countries - the UK and the US. For this, we received the ire of the world, blamed for 1 million deaths cynically allowed by a wily dictator. Suddenly we would receive this consensus? The French and Russians were suddenly just going to give up on their oil contracts? Sell it elsewhere. We didn't want Hussein contained, at the expense of our image and our effort - we wanted him gone and that is entirely in line with American foreign policy traditions.
Fukuyama, does however, make a very accurate [to my mind] observation:
"The administration's policy choices have not been restrained by domestic political concerns any more than by American foreign policy culture. Much has been made of the emergence of "red state" America, which supposedly constitutes the political base for President Bush's unilateralist foreign policy, and of the increased number of conservative Christians who supposedly shape the president's international agenda. But the extent and significance of these phenomena have been much exaggerated.
So much attention has been paid to these false determinants of administration policy that a different political dynamic has been underappreciated. Within the Republican Party, the Bush administration got support for the Iraq war from the neoconservatives (who lack a political base of their own but who provide considerable intellectual firepower) and from what Walter Russell Mead calls "Jacksonian America" - American nationalists whose instincts lead them toward a pugnacious isolationism.
Happenstance then magnified this unlikely alliance. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the inability to prove relevant connections between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda left the president, by the time of his second inaugural address, justifying the war exclusively in neoconservative terms: that is, as part of an idealistic policy of political transformation of the broader Middle East. The president's Jacksonian base, which provides the bulk of the troops serving and dying in Iraq, has no natural affinity for such a policy but would not abandon the commander in chief in the middle of a war, particularly if there is clear hope of success."
Jacksonians traditionally support muscular foreign policy, but only because it is in our best interests. The problem is that the President never initially made the neo-Conservative case for this war, explaining why exactly a democratic Iraq was in this nation's long term interests. He didn't need to, opting instead to use WMD as a reason that would more easily attract domestic American support and make an international case, one that we believed was airtight even when we realized we'd be forced to deal with European obstructions. In the end, they'd end up with that much egg on your face as we paraded chemical weapons past the Security Council.
In retrospect, we suffered the most crippling intelligence failure in this nation's history. Decades of political correct bullshit, the elimination of our human intelligence capabilities, and institutional group think delivered one of the biggest surprises of this country's political history. There's plenty of blame to go around for that one, and I don't plan on dealing with it any more here. The point is, in my opinion, neo-Conservatism wasn't sold.
The exportation of democracy was of course a major goal for the invasion of Iraq from the very beginning. It was not the only goal: a short description also includes the need to set an example and prove we could act, to get rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons, there's a number of them and they've been outlined much better by people much more intelligent than I. Neo-conservatism, Iraqi democracy, was, however, the big tomale - it links Iraq to the War on Terror, our bigger problem. When the easy to grasp rationale of WMD fell through, the administration was left using vague statements supporting the spread of freedom, but we'd never set the context for this apparently [especially to an willfully stupid political opposition] sudden shift.
The problem that Fukuyama correctly observes is that since the neo-Conservative argument - why this was in America's best interests - had never been set, too many Jacksonians, the key to America's war-making potential, may see it as spreading freedom for its own sake, rather than as a necessary step for American security.
"This war coalition is fragile, however, and vulnerable to mishap. If Jacksonians begin to perceive the war as unwinnable or a failure, there will be little future support for an expansive foreign policy that focuses on promoting democracy. That in turn could drive the 2008 Republican presidential primaries in ways likely to affect the future of American foreign policy as a whole."
I agree with Fukuyama, Jacksonians will not buy an apparently losing effort merely for the "noble Iraqi people". Selling this war as a humanitarian venture is a losing proposition for them. Furthermore, if we fail in Iraq, and possibly even if we succeed, I don't think the Bush doctrine will survive. We may generally support liberalization and democratization as we always have, but it will not nearly be as active and direct an effort. There will not be an Operation Iranian/Pakistani/Saudi Freedom. If anything, the lesson the military and political establishment has learned from Iraq is that this sure as hell isn't anything we want to do again lightly.
I myself am a Jacksonian, but one who has adopted neo-conservatism as a tactic - but importantly, not an identity. It is a tool in the toolbox, not an all encompassing mindset. The question for me isn't whether the neo-conservative effort in Iraq is theoretically in line with America's interests. I think it is. The problem is the state of the world, with its so many opposing interests, the sheer retrograde state of much of the Islamic world and the so many factors working to keep it there, including Europe's utter obstructionism. With this imperfect world, it may not be a viable tactic. Iraq's a test case, due to many reasons it presented the only offered place to start. So if neo-conservatism fails, where would we go next? If it fails, we're back to step 1, except in an even worse position than where we started, and with our primary strategy needing replacement.
A Democratic foreign policy is much harder to predict, because it is unclear whether the loons of the Dean wing will retain their control or the more realistic Clinton moderates will retake back the Party. I’m not too optimistic of the latter occurring at the moment. However, a Republican fall back position is more easy to grasp. I would expect the temporary evolution of some sort of self-interested muscular foreign policy, with a touch of isolationism. This would be accompanied by the end of politically correct and obsolete diplomacy, pretending that traditional "friends" will always be so and finding some new friends, ones with similar interests to ours. I'd also expect the mothballing of the "you build it, you break it" line of warfare. Where possible it should be done, but I suspect in most cases it will be merely self-defeating and draining. We'll never against suspect that we can redo thousands of year of indigenous culture so easily. In the absence of this carrot, stick-driven gun boat diplomacy will be a likely substitute.
We'll find ourselves still acting in the worst places, but it'll be for much shorter term goals and shorter-lasting efforts. It also won't be a total isolationism, although it most certainly will include a general reduction of American military commitments in non-essential areas. It will be a much more selfish foreign policy. We'll keep ties with helpful allies such as Japan, India, Australia, Eastern Europe, and possibly the UK [depending on if they go EUnuch]. Most importantly, however, we will work with countries that are willing and able to actually contribute to our efforts, and who are not just are looking to be taken seriously and courted for their stamp of approval. Does it mean we'll abandon the field to the enemy? No, but absent emergency contigency scenarios, our commitments will be low-scale, often not well publicized, and in places most Americans have never heard of.
Plenty of controversial things for readers to comment on, and I gladly welcome them to. It’s obviously a work in process, a necessary evil with a world we’re only beginning to reengage after a decade of sleepwalking.
Thanks to Outside the Beltway.






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